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Knox v. North American Car Corp.: Re-
Examination of Privity of Contract in UCC
Implied Warranty Actions
INTRODUCTION
Products liability law and strict liability in tort' have grown rap-
idly in the past fifteen years. A key factor in this development has
been the erosion of the doctrine of privity of contract as a requisite
to recovery by a user of a defective product in actions against a
remote manufacturer. The doctrine retains viability in warranty
actions by non-purchasing users of the defective product. In Knox
v. North American Car Corp.,2 the Illinois Appellate Court af-
firmed the doctrine by holding that an employee of a consignee of
a leased railroad boxcar lacked the requisite privity to qualify as a
third party beneficiary of an implied warranty in an action filed
under the UCC.'
This article will analyze the doctrine of privity in Illinois and
evaluate its retention in products liability actions for breach of
warranty. The exceptions to the doctrine that developed to allevi-
ate the often harsh results accompanying its application will then
be discussed. Next, Knox will be examined in light of the doctrine
as it has been applied in similar actions for products related inju-
ries. The article will then analyze the doctrine as a requisite to
recovery for breaches of the UCC's implied warranty provisions by
non-purchasing users who have sustained personal injuries from a
defective product. Finally, this article will recommend that fore-
seeability be substituted for privity as a limitation on recovery in
third party beneficiary actions filed pursuant to UCC §2-318. 4
1. The products liability explosion began with Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), in which the court adopted the theory of strict liability in tort. For
an explanation of the development of this theory, see, notes 28 through 30, infra, and ac-
companying text.
2. 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355 (1st Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114
(May 29, 1980).
3. Id.
4. UCC §2-318 exists in three alternative forms. Alternative A provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
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Privity-Generally
Background
Confusion and controversy surround the doctrine of privity in
personal injury actions for breach of warranty. Much of this confu-
sion stems from the dual nature of warranty actions. Courts have
analyzed warranty actions in terms of tort principles (based on
theories of negligence or strict liability) or contract principles"
(based on common law breach of warranty or violations of war-
ranty provisions contained in the UCC). Courts frequently fail to
distinguish tort from contract principles in analyzing warranty
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
This provision has been adopted in a majority of jurisdictions, including Illinois (see, Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, §2-318). Two jurisdictions, California and Utah, omitted Alternative
A entirely when the UCC was enacted. Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island and Virginia have extended protection to a reasonably foreseeable user
through legislative amendment to §2-318. Connecticut, Texas and Pennsylvania have judi-
cially eliminated the privity requirement.
Alternative B provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B incorporates foreseeability as the standard for determining the scope of a
manufacturer's liability for personal injuries resulting from defective products. (Emphasis
added). Alternative B has been adopted in eight jurisdictions: Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Kansas, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming.
Alternative C. provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the
warranty extends.
Alternative C extends protection to foreseeable users and includes within its scope actions
for economic loss and actions for personal injuries. Alternative C has been adopted in four
jurisdictions: Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, and North Dakota.
Alternative A represents the original text of UCC §2-318. Alternative B was "designed for
states where the case law has already developed further and for those that desire to expand
the class of beneficiaries." U.C.C. §2-318, Comment 3. Alternative C was designed to reflect
the modern trend embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (1965). Id. Horizontal
privity is at issue only in those jurisdictions which have adopted Alternative A.
5. For an example of this mode of analysis, see, Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
171 Ill. App. 355 (1st Dist. 1912)(negligence action for breach of warranty); and Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (warranty action predicated on strict
liability in tort).
6. For an example of this mode of analysis, see, Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental
Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1st Dist. 1966)(recovery permitted by third
party user from remote manufacturer of aerosal cans for property damage resulting from
leakage of cans on the theory that the user was a third party beneficiary of the contract).
Privity of Contract
actions.'
The key distinction between tort and contract actions is the na-
ture of the interests protected. Principles of tort law protect the
interest in freedom from risk of injury.8 Tort actions are predi-
cated on the existence of a duty, the breach of which gives rise to a
cause of action for damages. This duty is imposed on the basis of
public policy irrespective of the intent of the parties.9
Principles of contract law protect the interest in performance of
promises created by mutual consent of the parties. 10 The underly-
ing purpose of contract law is to afford contracting parties the ben-
efit of their bargain-to put them in the position they would have
been in if the contract had been performed." This relationship
arises from the mutual intent of the parties. Privity derives from
the consensual nature of this relationship and embodies the con-
cept that only parties to the contract may sue to enforce it. In con-
trast to tort actions, the mutual consent of the parties manifested
in the contract defines the scope of liability. 12
Where a third party user who has sustained personal injuries at-
tempts to enforce a contracting party's obligations, elements of
tort and contract principles are combined. Courts, however, have
been inconsistent in analyzing this situation. Consequently, war-
ranty actions have been characterized as a "curious hybrid, born of
7. Davidson, supra, note 5. An employee sued to recover for personal injuries sustained
from the explosion of a defective grinding wheel purchased from the defendant by his em-
ployer. The court concluded that the defendant, through the descriptions in its catalog, held
itself out as a manufacturer and had assumed the attendant responsibility and obligations
for injuries due to the defective condition of the product. Id. at 367. The court held that the
existence of these express warranties, together with the employer's reliance on them sup-
ported recovery. Id. at 369. Supporting authorities cited by the court, however, speak in
terms of foreseeability and misrepresentation. Id. at 370-72. Consequently, it is unclear
whether the court's holding is based on tort or contract principles.
8. The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the
interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in freedom
from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them are
imposed by the law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessa-
rily upon the will or intention of the parties.
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 401, 335 N.E.2d 275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.
2d 39, 41 (N.Y. 1975)(quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §92, at 613 (4th
ed. 1971)).
9. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC
and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 122, 127 (1974).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law.""1
Winterbottom u. Wright" presented an early indication of the
confusion inherent in personal injury warranty actions. A coach-
man sued to recover for personal injuries sustained when the mail
coach he was driving broke down. He relied primarily on a contract
between the contractor and the postmaster general whereby the
contractor agreed to supply and maintain the coach. Although the
action sounded in tort, the court sustained a demurrer, ruling that
no action could be maintained on the contract by one who was not
a party to it." Despite references to the "negligent" performance
of the contractor's contractual duties and to "this action in tort"
the holding was based on principles of contract law.'6
As a result of this decision, privity became firmly entrenched in
13. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 634 (4th ed. 1971).
14. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The doctrine of privity has been the subject of numer-
ous law review commentaries. See, Dickerson, ABC's of Products Liability, 36 Tenn. L. Rev.
439 (1969); Donovan, Recent Development in Products Liability Litigation in New Eng-
land, 19 Maine L. Rev. 181 (1967)[hereinafter cited as Donovan]; Ezer, The Impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
281 (1961)[hereinafter cited as Ezer]; Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L
Rev. 119 (1958)[hereinafter cited at Gillam]; Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin
Sounded?, 1 Duq. U. L. Rev. 1 (1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Lia-
bility to the Consumer), 69 Yale L. J. 1099 '(1960)[hereinafter cited as Prosser, The As-
sault]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966); Article Two Warran-
ties in Commercial Transactions, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 30 (1978)[hereinafter 'cited as Article
Two Warranties].
15. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (Ex. 1842).
16. Id. at 403, 405. Lord Abinger noted:
By permitting this action, we should be working this injustice, that after the de-
fendant had done every thing to the satisfaction of his employer, and after all
matters between them had been adjusted, and all acounts settled on the footing of
their contract, we should subject them to be ripped open by this action of tort
being brought against him.
Id. at 405.
In a concurring opinion, Alderson, B. stated:
If we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue in such a case, there is no point at
which such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to continue the right to re-
cover to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is
no reason why we should not go fifty. The only real argument in favour of the
action is, that this is a case of hardship; but that might have been obviated, if the
plaintiff had made himself a party to the contract.
Id.
And, Rolfe, B., in a separate concurring opinion noted:
The duty [sought to be imposed on the contractor] . . . is shown to have arisen
solely from the contract; and the fallacy consists in the use of that word, "duty."
If a duty to the Postmaster-General be meant, that is true; but if a duty to the
plaintiff be intended ... there was none.
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tort law. The fear of unlimited litigation underscored adoption of
the doctrine.1" Uniform acceptance of this limitation stemmed pri-
marily from a desire to protect manufacturers from numerous and
costly claims which would inhibit commercial development.18
Privity in Illinois
In Illinois, actions for breach of warranty have generally been
regarded as actions ex contractu requiring privity of contract.1 ' In
warranty actions predicated on tort theories, however, courts have
adopted the general rule that a contractor, manufacturer or vendor
is not liable to third parties with whom he has no contractual rela-
tions."' Due to the harshness of the doctrine courts developed nu-
merous exceptions to circumvent privity as a requisite to recovery
in breach of warranty actions.2 0 In conjunction with these deci-
17. There is not privity of contract between these parties; and if plaintiff can sue,
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by
the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the
operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
Id.
18. Donovan, supra, note 14 at 184.
19. Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1957).
19.1. Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Ill. App. 355 (1st Dist. 1912). In Rotche
v. Buick Motor Co., 358 II. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
privity is required in negligence actions involving a defective product.
20. One commentator has listed 29 such theories. See, Gillam, supra, note 14 at 153-55.
For example, one court permitted recovery ruling that the actual purchaser of defective
goods was acting as an agent of the plaintiff. See, Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1941).
The earliest exception to the privity doctrine occurred in actions to recover for personal
injuries resulting from consumption of contaminated foods. Prior to Davidson v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., 171 I11. App. 355 (1st Dist. 1912), the Illinois Supreme Court held that lack
of privity was not a defense in an action against the seller of food products for breach of an
implied warranty of fitness and wholesomeness for consumption. Wiedeman v. Keller, 171
Ill. 93, 99, 49 N.E. 210, 211 (1897). The court based its holding on the principle that a
warranty of fitness is implied at law for the protection of public health and safety. Id. at 96,
49 N.E. at 210-11.
Subsequently, Illinois courts relied on public policy to expand the classes of beneficiaries
entitled to warranty protection in food products cases. The class of beneficiaries expanded
horizontally to include members of the purchaser's family, Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318
Ill. App. 205, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1st Dist. 1943), and the ultimate consumer of the food product,
Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 I11. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320 (1st Dist. 1945).
Eventually, the manufacturer of an unwholesome food product was held strictly liable to
parties not in privity of contract because the implied warranty of fitness for human con-
sumption ran with the sale of the product. Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 III. App.
117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1st Dist. 1947). Although this theory is based on contract principles, the
court articulated underlying policy considerations which foreshadowed the adoption of strict
liability in tort. The court noted that the manufacturer places a product in the stream of
commerce with the expectation that a consumer will rely on its appearance as being suitable
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sions, Illinois courts developed the theory that a manufacturer's or
seller's implied warranty ran with the sale of the product.2 1
In Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,'2 the court recognized
three exceptions to the general rule that a manufacturer is not lia-
ble to third parties absent privity. Privity was not required where
the negligent act of the manufacturer or vendor caused risk of in-
jury to the consumer; the negligent act of an owner caused injury
to an invitee on the owner's premises; and the vendor sold or deliv-
ered an article which he knew to be imminently dangerous without
disclosing its dangerous qualities.28 The court in Rotche v. Buick
Motor Co."4 approved of the rationale in MacPherson v. Buick Mo-
tor Co. 5 and expanded the categories of exceptions to include in-
herently dangerous products.' These exceptions were advanced
primarily on public policy grounds-the manufacturer's liability
for personal injuries from defective products was imposed by law
for human consumption. Id. at 131, 74 N.E.2d at 168-69. Furthermore, a manufacturer solic-
its the purchase and use of its product through extensive advertising and marketing tech-
niques. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that it would be inequitable to permit a manufac-
turer to rely on privity to escape liability. Id.
In Suvada, the court recognized that the policy justifications underlying abolition of priv-
ity as a defense in sale of food cases were equally compelling where personal injuries re-
suited from products other than contaminated food. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d
608, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965). This finding culminated in the adoption of strict liabil-
ity in tort. Thus, the demise of privity of contract as a requisite to recovery in tort actions
for breach of warranty was complete.
21. Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 IIl. App. 117, 133, 74 N.E.2d 162, 169 (1st
Dist. 1947). "Where an article of food or drink is sold in a sealed container for human
consumption, public policy demands that an implied warranty be imposed upon the manu-
facturer thereof that such article is wholesome and fit for use, that said warranty runs with
the sale of the article for the benefit of the consumer thereof .
22. 171 Ill. App. 355 (1st Dist. 1912).
23. Id. at 364. The court declined to indicate if any of these exceptions supported recov-
ery by an employee who sustained personal injuries from the explosion of a defective grind-
ing wheel purchased by his employer.
24. 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934).
25. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
26. Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 517, 193 N.E. 529, 532 (1934). In Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 616, 210 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1965), the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), "had
expanded the concept that imminently dangerous articles such as explosives, poisons and
other things which in their normal operation are implements of destruction, to the concept
that any article negligently manufactured, which is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril, is a thing of danger." Noting that this exception effectively "swallowed" the general
rule of nonliability, the court explicitly abolished privity in all tort actions against manufac-
turers. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 616-17, 210 N.E.2d 182, 184-85 (1965).
This conclusion coupled with the adoption of strict liability in tort renders irrelevant the
distinction between imminently and inherently dangerous products.
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to protect the health and safety of consumers. 7 This rationale
evolved into the theory of strict liability in tort which eliminated
privity as a requisite to recovery for personal injuries in tort ac-
tions against remote manufacturers.
In Suvada v. White Motor Co. 2 8 the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the theory of strict liability in tort. Cognizant of prior ex-
ceptions to the privity requirement, the court concluded that the
public policy justifications used to support these exceptions were
equally compelling where the personal injuries resulted from any
defective product. 9 The court specifically cited the public's inter-
est in life and health; the manufacturer's reliance on marketing
and advertising to induce the public to use its product and to im-
pliedly represent that the product is safe; and the risk of loss as
being more properly borne by the manufacturer who profits from
marketing the product. Therefore, the court decided that the law
of tort rather than contract was the appropriate means to deter-
mine the scope of a manufacturer's liability for products related
injuries.80
Other cases evolved to circumvent the privity requirement.
These cases emphasized contract principles rather than tort princi-
ples and proceeded under the third party beneficiary theory. This
rule was enunciated in Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett:s1
The test is whether the benefit to the third person is direct to
him or is but an incidental benefit to him arising from the con-
tract. If direct he may sue on the contract; if incidental he has no
right of recovery thereon . . . . The rule is, that the right of a
third party benefited by a contract to sue thereon rests upon the
27. See, note 20, supra.
28. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Plaintiffs purchased a used reconditioned trac-
tor unit from defendant White Motor Co. The brake system was manufactured by Bendix-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co. and installed by White. The brake system failed
and caused the tractor to collide with a bus, resulting in injuries to the bus passengers and
damage to the bus and tractor. The court applied the theory of strict liability in tort in
allowing recovery for property damage and costs incurred in settling the personal injury
claims of the bus passengers.
29. Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
30. Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The appellate court imposed strict liability based on
an implied warranty theory, holding that lack of privity was not a defense to such action.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, declined to address the issue of whether lack of priv-
ity is a defense in an implied warranty action brought pursuant to UCC §2-318. Id. at 622,
210 N.E.2d at 188.
31. 346 Ill. 252, 257-58, 178 N.E. 498, 501 (1931)(supplier of hotel furnishings permitted
to recover for cost of goods as third party beneficiary of contract between hotel company
and underwriter).
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liability of the promisor, and this liability must affirmatively ap-
pear from the language of the instrument when properly inter-
preted and construed. The liability so appearing can not be ex-
tended or enlarged on the ground, alone, that the situation and
circumstances of the parties justify or demand further or other
liability.
The third party's right to enforce the contract rests solely on the
promisor's intent to benefit the non-contracting third party.
The viability of this theory was affirmed in Rhodes Pharmacal
Co. v. Continental Can Co.2 The court permitted a non-con-
tracting third party user to directly enforce an implied warranty of
fitness against the manufacturer on the grounds that the manufac-
turer had knowledge of the intended use of the product and of the
user's reliance that the product would be fit for that use."3 This
ruling emphasized the contractual basis of warranty actions.
Privity and the UCC
UCC §2-318 as adopted in Illinois3 4 maintains the third party
beneficiary exception to privity. This section names as beneficiaries
of a warranty the purchaser and "any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is the guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty."3 3 This section, however, fails to alleviate the confusion
surrounding the doctrine in breach of warranty actions.
Section 2-318 generates two problems. First, this section recog-
nizes a cause of action for personal injuries that introduces foresee-
ability into commercial sales transactions. This provision sustains
the tension generated by the tort-contract dichotomy." Thus, the
32. 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1st Dist. 1966). Third party user sued remote
manufacturer of aerosol cans for property damage resulting from leakage of the cans.
33. Id. at 373, 219 N.E.2d at 732. For an analysis of the effect of this case on developing
case law for products related injuries see, McNulty, Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code: The Third Party Beneficiary of Warranties is Alive and Well and Liv-
ing in Illinois, 51 Chi. B. Rec. 339 (1970).
Although the contract negotiations in the case were completed prior to the effective date
of the UCC, the court implied that its holding would apply to breach of warranty actions
brought pursuant to the UCC. Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Il. App. 2d
362, 371-72, 219 N.E.2d 726, 731-32 (1st Dist. 1966).
34. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, §2-318.
35. Id. This is the original version of §2-318 and conforms to what is now Alternative A.
Subsequently, two additional alternatives were adopted. The text of these alternative provi-
sions is reproduced at note 4, supra.
36. See, text accompanying notes 5 through 7, supra.
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question of whether tort or contract principles control third party
breach of warranty actions remains unanswered.
The second problem concerns the effect of comment 3 on the
scope of protection under UCC §2-318. Although the section ex-
tends protection to specific classes of beneficiaries (i.e., family
members or guests in the purchaser's home), comment 3 expresses
neutrality with respect to expansion of the classes of benefi-
ciaries.87 Comment 3 fails to clarify whether judicial expansion of
the categories may proceed horizontally and vertically.
Privity denotes the relationship between the promisor and the
promisee, or in commercial sales terminology, between the vendor
and the vendee. 8 There are two basic types of privity: horizontal
and vertical. 8e Horizontal privity describes the situation in which
the injured party who is not a purchaser seeks to maintain an ac-
tion against the last seller. Horizontal privity "arises only after all
resales have been completed and one reaches the flat plane spread-
ing outwards from the last purchaser."' 0
In contrast, vertical privity denotes the relationships among the
parties within the chain of distribution. For example, where goods
are distributed through a four-linked chain, which includes a man-
ufacturer, wholesaler, retailer and purchaser, three distinct trans-
actions are discernible. The manufacturer is in privity solely with
the wholesaler. The wholesaler, however, participated in two trans-
actions and is in privity with both the manufacturer and the re-
tailer. Similarly, the retailer is in privity with the wholesaler and
the purchaser. The purchaser, however, is in privity only with the
retailer.
Some commentators have suggested that §UCC 2-318 focuses ex-
clusively on horizontal privity and leaves the question of whether
vertical privity is to be retained in UCC warranty actions to judi-
37. Comment 3 to §2-318 provides in pertinent part: "Beyond this, the section is neutral
and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."
38. J. White and R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, §11-2 at 327 (1972).
39. A third type of privity is "diagonal" privity which describes the relationships in a
suit by a purchaser "or beneficiary of his questionable largess" against someone in the dis-
tributive chain other than the last seller. Ezer, supra, note 14 at 323. Courts frequently fall
to distinguish between vertical, horizontal and diagonal privity. This has resulted in confu-
sion as to the status of the doctrine in particular jurisdictions.
For a detailed analysis of the distinctions and problems associated with the basic types of
privity, see, Ezer, supra, note 14 and Donovan, supra, note 14 at 216-24.
40. Ezer, supra, note 14 at 323.
19801
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cial determination. 41 The jurisdictions which have considered the
scope of horizontal privity under §2-318 have reached conflicting
determinations. Some jurisdictions have interpreted the language
as providing suggested classes of beneficiaries which may be judi-
cially expanded;4 2 others have literally construed §2-318 to pre-
clude extension beyond the enumerated classes.43
In Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co.,44 the Illinois Supreme Court
abolished vertical privity as a requisite to recovery in UCC breach
of warranty actions. The Berry court determined that the statutory
cause of action for breach of warranty established under the UCC
is distinct from an action predicated on strict liability in tort; con-
sequently, it is subject to restrictions incorporated elsewhere in the
UCC. 45 The court, however, construed §2-318 to hold that vertical
41. See, McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973); Donovan, supra, note
14 at 220; Article Two Warranties, supra, note 14 at 258.
42. See, Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 681 (10th Cir.
1967)(applying Oklahoma law); Fashion Novelty Corp. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co. 331
F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1971); McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
381 (Me. 1973); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976).
43. See, Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying
Alaska law); General Motors Corp. v. Davis, 141 Ga. App. 495, 233 S.E.2d 825 (1977); Chen
v. Reliable Rubber & Plastic Mach., Inc., 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1274 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978). A
literal construction of §2-318 can have anomolous results. Compare, Tomczuk v. Town of
Chesire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965) (plaintiff, a minor and friend of purchaser's
daughter, injured as a result of defects in bicycle was considered guest in purchaser's home
and not required to give notice to bicycle manufacturer as condition precedent to suit) with
Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961)(passenger in purchaser's automo-
bile not a guest in the purchaser's home within the plain meaning of §2-318 but lack of
privity did not preclude action against manufacturer in light of "developing case law").
Query whether the decision in Tomczuk was based on assumption that plaintiff was riding
the defective bicycle in the purchaser's home when the injury occurred.
It has been suggested that a literal interpretation of Alternative A conforms with the
intention of the drafters. See, Article Two Warranties, supra, note 14 at 258. Other com-
mentators have disagreed with this interpretation since the text does not support a negative
inference. See, Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 597, 616-19 and Franklin, When Worlds Collide, 18 Stan. L. Rev.
974, 1000 (1966).
44. 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). Martha Berry sought recovery for personal
injuries sustained after taking an oral contraceptive manufactured by the defendant. Count
I was premised on a breach of an implied warranty of fitness under the UCC.
Abolition of vertical privity is a logical extension of the holding in Rhodes Pharmacal Co.
v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1st Dist. 1966). The Rhodes
court permitted direct enforcement of an implied warranty by a third party user against a
manufacturer despite lack of privity. See, notes 32 through 33, supra, and accompanying
text.
45. Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 553-54, 309 N.E.2d 550, 553-54 (1974).
The court specifically addressed the limitations period contained in §2-725(1) [4 years] and
the notice provision contained in §2-607(3)(a) [buyer must notify seller of breach within
Privity of Contract
"privity is of no consequence when a buyer who purportedly has
sustained personal injuries predicates recovery against a remote
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty under the Code." 6
In Goldstein v. G. D. Searle & Co.47 the Illinois Appellate Court
analyzed the effect of contract principles on personal injury actions
for breach of warranty. The issue presented to the court was
whether plaintiff, a subpurchaser, had complied with the Code's
notice provisions. 48 Privity was relevant to the court's inquiry of
whether notice to the immediate seller constituted notice to the
manufacturer. In concluding that notice to the immediate seller
was sufficient, the court relied on Berry to support its theory that
"warranties . . . flow downstream with the goods through any
number of intermediate sales eventually enuring to the benefit of
the ultimate consumer." 4' Berry and Goldstein involved privity be-
tween purchasers and remote manufacturers, but the broad lan-
guage used by the Berry court suggests it may be unduly restric-
tive to equate "ultimate consumer" with "purchaser."' 0
In Knox v. North American Car Corp.51 Illinois courts examined
the scope of horizontal privity under the UCC for the first time.
The Knox court denied recovery to a third party user and joined
those jurisdictions which have literally construed §2-318."s This de-
cision represents a departure from the trend toward abolishing
privity as a requisite to recovery for personal injuries in implied
warranty actions.
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered the breach). The court held
that §2-725(1) is the appropriate limitations period for personal injury actions. Id. at 555,
309 N.E.2d at 554.
46. Id. at 558, 309 N.E.2d at 556. The court interpreted §2-318 in light of prior decisions
based on tort theory.
47. 62 11. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1st Dist. 1978) (purchaser sued manufacturer of
oral contraceptives for personal injuries alleging breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
human consumption.
48. 11. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 26, §2-607(3)(a).
49. Goldstein v. G. D. Searle & Co., 62 II. App. 3d 344, 349, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (1st
Dist. 1978). Query whether this language resurrects the "running warranty theory" used to
circumvent the privity requirement in sale of food cases. See, note 21, supra.
50. Indeed, courts have interpreted Berry as authority to support expansion of the clas-
ses of third party beneficiaries beyond those specifically enumerated in Alternative A of
UCC §2-318. See, Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 1215 (Mass. 1977) and Milbank
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976).
51. 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E. 2d 1355 (1st Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114
(May 29, 1980).
52. See, note 43, supra.
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KNOX v. NORTH AMERICAN CAR CORP.
Plaintiff, Johnnie B. Knox, filed a complaint against defendant
North American Car Corp. (NAC) seeking recovery for personal in-
juries allegedly resulting from breach of an implied warranty under
UCC §2-315." NAC," an equipment lessor, had leased a railroad
boxcar to the Hershey Chocolate Corporation. The terms of the
lease required Hershey to inform NAC of the movement of the
boxcar, its loading dates, the nature of the commodities shipped in
the boxcar, and its destination and routing." In return, NAC
agreed to assume responsibility for all repairs except "running re-
pairs."" Repairs to the floor of the boxcar were not considered
running repairs.
After using the car for a number of years, Hershey notified NAC
that there was a hole in the floor of the boxcar which needed re-
pair. Subsequently, Hershey loaded the boxcar, still in its damaged
condition, and consigned it to the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Company in New Orleans. Johnnie Knox, an A & P employee was
injured when he drove a forklift truck into the boxcar and a wheel
of the truck fell into the hole in the floor.
Although the injury occurred on November 13, 1973, Johnnie
Knox failed to file his complaint until February 2, 1977.57 Conse-
quently, the statutory period for filing non-UCC personal injury
actions had expired." Thus, Johnnie Knox predicated recovery
53. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, §2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified .. .an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
Count I of the complaint was Johnnie Knox's action for personal injuries. Count II of the
complaint was an action by Irene Peavy Knox for loss of consortium. Since this action was
contingent upon recovery under Count I, dismissal of Count I resulted in dismissal of Count
II. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 690, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (1st Dist.
1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
54. NAC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Id. at
684, 399 N.E.2d at 1356.
55. Id.
56. Id. Hershey was permitted to make other repairs upon written consent from
defendant.
57. Id.
58. Since the injury occurred in Louisiana but the suit was filed in Illinois, a conflict
arose as to whether Louisiana or Illinois law controlled. NAC contended that Louisiana law
was applicable and, therefore, Johnnie Knox's cause of action was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Furthermore, NAC argued that even if
Illinois law was controlling, Johnnie Knox's action was barred by the two-year limitations
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upon breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose pursuant to UCC §2-315. Knox contended that he was a bene-
ficiary within the scope of §2-318 and, therefore, qualified for the
Code's four-year limitations period. 9
NAC moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
statue of limitations barred the cause of action. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss, holding the UCC four-year statute
of limitations inapplicable because a lease transaction is not a sale
within the provisions of the Code. 60
On appeal, the court found that the trial court erred in holding
that Article 2 was inapplicable to lease transactions. 1 However,
period applicable to personal injury actions. NAC also maintained that the four-year statute
of limitations contained in UCC §2-725 was not applicable. Id., at 685-86, 399 N.E.2d at
1357.
59. In his brief before the Illinois Appellate Court, Johnnie Knox contended that the
benefits of the UCC were designed to protect all persons likely to be affected by the prod-
uct. Consequently, privity was not essential to this determination. Brief for Appellant at 25,
Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 11. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355 (1st Dist. 1980), appeal
denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980). He interpreted Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56 I1. 2d
548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974), to hold that UCC §2-318 is to be construed liberally. Id.
Knox maintained that in this situation the need for recovery was particularly acute be-
cause the equipment lessor puts its vehicles to more sustained use than normal purchasers
or users. Thus, the number of persons likely to be affected by the product increases and
these persons are subjected "to a greater quantum of potential danger of harm from defec-
tive vehicles than usually arises out of sales by manufacturers." Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing, 212 A.2d 769, 777 (N.J. 1965). (Emphasis in original.) Consequently, the risk of
injury extended beyond Hershey, the lessee, to the employees of each consignee who were
required to enter the boxcar. Brief at 26.
Furthermore, Knox argued that other jurisdictions have liberally interpreted §2-318 to
include lessors who have sustained property damage from defective products (Milbank Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976)); bystanders (Ciampichini v. Ring Bros.,
Inc., 40 A.D.2d 289, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (App. Div. 1973)); and employees (Delta Oxygen Co.
v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark. 1964); McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 14
U.C.C. Rep. 381 (Me. 1973); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974)).
This liberal interpretation is consistent with Illinois decisions based on the doctrine of strict
liability in tort and which have extended protection to bystanders. Brief at 28. Knox as-
serted that privity under the UCC was implicitly abolished in Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
32 II. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), notwithstanding the court's refusal to consider the
effect of UCC §2-318 in that action. Brief at 29. He concluded that in light of "extensive
interstate commerce a manufacturer or distributor of a dangerous or defective product can-
not be allowed refuge from liability under the ancient doctrine of privity." Id.
60. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 11. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1357-58 (1st
Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
61. The court held that selected provisions of Article 2 applied to leases by analogy. Cf.
Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home, 49 II. App. 3d 213, 219, 365 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (1st
Dist. 1977)(court "will analogize the provisions of article 2 to equipment leases only when
the case involves the same considerations which gave rise to the Code's provisions .... ").
The Knox court concluded that NAC's agreement to make all repairs to the boxcar (except
running repairs) gave "rise to a contractual implied warranty of fitness analogous to that
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the court affirmed dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that
Knox was not a third party beneficiary within the scope of §2-
318.2 The court distinguished vertical from horizontal privity and
noted that §2-318 applies only to horizontal privity.a3 The court
then determined that by electing to enact the most restrictive of
the three available alternatives the Illinois legislature manifested
an intent to limit beneficiaries to those classes of persons specifi-
cally enumerated in the statute."
applicable to sales under section 2-315." Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683,
688, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (1st Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
62. In so ruling the court accepted the arguments advanced in NAC's brief. NAC noted
that the Illinois legislature adopted Alternative A of UCC §2-318 despite the availability of
more liberal alternatives. NAC cited Official Comment 2 to §2-318 which states that the
purpose of the provision was to give "certain beneficiaries" the same warranty benefits re-
ceived by the buyer in the "contract of sale." Brief for Appellee at 39, Knox v. North Am.
Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355 (1st Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114
(May 29, 1980). (Emphasis in original.) Therefore, the Illinois legislature intended to extend
protection only to those classes of beneficiaries specifically enumerated in the statute. Id.
NAC also contended that Knox's reliance on Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548,
309 N.E.2d 550 (1974), as abolishing privity under the UCC was misplaced. NAC distin-
guished Berry on the grounds that Berry related solely to the issue of vertical privity in
breach of warranty actions and not horizontal privity. Brief at 40. NAC cited Omaha Pollu-
tion Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1069 (D.C. Neb. 1976) to sup-
port its assertion that UCC §2-318 permits judicial elimination of vertical privity but not
horizontal privity. In contrast NAC concluded that Knox was not in the chain of distribu-
tion and consequently, outside the scope of Berry. Brief at 42.
Moreover, NAC asserted that other Alternative A jurisdictions had declined to extend
protection to employees of purchasers. See, Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 505 F.2d
243 (4th Cir. 1974), ,15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 615 (applying North Carolina law); Weaver v.
Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 536, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 962 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975)(reh. den. July 31, 1975); Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 690 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1975); Dickey v. Lockport Prestress- Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d 609, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
73 (N.Y. 1976); Hester v. Purex Corp., 46 Okla. Bar Assn. J. 656, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 697
(Okla. 1975). These decisions appear to be based on a literal interpretation of the language
in §2-318 or the belief that expansion of the classes of beneficiaries in §2-318 requires legis-
lative action.
NAC emphasized the attenuated relationship between Knox and NAC. NAC relied on
Neofes v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 409 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1976) as holding that §2-
318 is not applicable to a lessee of the purchaser of an allegedly defective product. Since
Knox was in a more remote position and there was no sales contract to support a warranty,
there was no basis for recovery. Brief at 45-46. Therefore, NAC concluded that despite the
demise of privity in warranty actions based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort, there is
no case law in Illinois to support elimination of the doctrine under the UCC. Id. at 46.
63. See, notes 40 through 43, supra, and accompanying text.
64. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 683, 689, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (1st Dist.
1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980). The court implied that an employee of
the last purchaser may be entitled to protection under §2-318 even though employees are
not among the enumerated classes. Id. See, Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339,
347, 353 P.2d 575, 581, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869 (1960)(recovery permitted because an employee
of the last purchaser is a member of the employer's "industrial family"); McNally v. Nichol-
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In a specially concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Simon found it un-
necessary to address the issue of whether Knox was a qualified
beneficiary under §2-318.ea J. Simon concluded that even if Knox
was a proper beneficiary of NAC's implied warranty of fitness, the
action was barred by the four-year limitations period contained in
UCC §2-725.66
Mr. Justice Rizzi's dissenting opinion stated that UCC §2-318
"should apply to users and all persons who may reasonably be ex-
pected to be affected by a breach of the implied warranty regard-
less of privity.' 6 7 He based his conclusion on prior case law involv-
ing the scope of a manufacturer's liability for personal injuries
resulting from defective products.68 Moreover, J. Rizzi reasoned
son Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973). The Knox court noted that McNally would be "per-
suasive authority" if Johnnie Knox were a Hershey employee. Knox v. North Am. Car
Corp., 80 11. App. 683, 689, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (Ist Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-
1114 (May 29, 1980). In this situation recovery was precluded since Knox was an employee
of the consignee of the boxcar, and, therefore, twice-removed from the last party in the
distribution chain. Id.
65. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 111. App. 3d 683, 691, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1361 (1st
Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
66. Mr. Justice Simon concluded that the Code's four-year limitations period barred
plaintiff's cause of action and precluded consideration of the applicability of §2-318. Since
defendant leased the boxcar on March 1, 1966, and tendered delivery to Hershey a short
time later, J. Simon reasoned that the cause of action accrued in 1966. Lack of a specific
guarantee of future performance rendered the discovery exception to the statute of limita-
tions inapplicable. Furthermore, the policy considerations which led to the adoption of the
discovery rule in Illinois were not applicable to commercial transactions and were offset by
the important interests of uniformity and commercial certainty. Id. at 693, 399 N.E.2d at
1366.
67. Id. at 698, 399 N.E.2d at 1366. The dissent determined that Illinois law and not
Louisiana law controlled disposition of the case and that an implied warranty of fitness was
established without artifically distinguishing between sale and lease transactions. Id. at 694-
96, 399 N.E.2d 1363-64.
68. J. Rizzi noted that a manufacturer has a duty to make its product reasonably safe for
its intended use. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 11. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401
(1969). This duty extends to individuals whose use of the product is reasonably foreseeable
and to situations in which the product is put to its intended or reasonably foreseeable use.
Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 11, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974). Foreseeability is defined in this
situation as "that which it is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might con-
ceivably occur." Id. at 12-13, 310 N.E.2d at 5. (Emphasis in original.)
This duty is imposed at law because "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market." Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 150, 379 N.E.2d 281, 285
(1978)(quoting Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944)). To further this policy, the Grzelinski court declined to exclude firemen, as a class,
from the scope of a manufacturer's liability for defective products. Id. at 151, 379 N.E.2d at
285.
J. Rizzi noted that vertical privity was abolished in UCC breach of warranty actions for
personal injuries in order to afford consumer protection. Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co., 56 11.
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that adoption of strict liability in tort supported expansion of the
categories of qualified beneficiaries in UCC §2-318 due to the simi-
larity between these two causes of action. 9
J. Rizzi contended that by basing its decision on the concept of
privity, the court resurrected a concept which was an unsatisfac-
tory method of determining liability.70 Specifically, he disagreed
with the conclusion that the language in Alternative A reflected a
legislative intent to eliminate privity only for those classes of bene-
ficiaries named in the statute. The dissent argued that the neutral-
ity expressed in comment 3 leaves applicability of the doctrine to
judicial discretion. 1
J. Rizzi noted that restricting the beneficiaries to those named in
the statute was inconsistent with the court's implication that an
employee of the last purchaser could qualify as a beneficiary de-
spite omission of employees from the text of UCC §2-318.72 This
reasoning would lead to the anomalous result of denying recovery
to Johnnie Knox because he is an employee of A & P while permit-
ting recovery by a Hershey employee under identical circum-
stances. This was a primary factor in J. Rizzi's conclusion that
privity should be abolished in UCC breach of warranty actions.73
2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). Therefore, to make strict liability and UCC breach of war-
ranty actions coextensive, horizontal privity under the UCC should also be eliminated.
69. J. Rizzi's analysis implies that liability for defective products under the theory of
strict liability in tort and UCC §2-318 should be coextensive. He cited the neutrality of
Comment 3 to UCC §2-318 as permitting judicial expansion of the classes of beneficiaries to
parallel developing case law. The developing case law in Illinois includes strict liability in
tort which affords protection to any user of the product despite the absence of a sale or
contractual relationship. Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (1965). These principles
have been judicially extended to all reasonably foreseeable users. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.
2d 7, 11, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974). Therefore, the legislative intent expressed in UCC §2-318
and the developing case law in the area of products liability should be reconciled by inter-
preting UCC §2-318 to include all reasonably foreseeable users irrespective of privity. Knox
v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 698, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (1st Dist. 1980),
appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
70. This is evident in the early recognition of exceptions to the doctrine. See, notes 20
through 33, supra, and accompanying text.
71. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1365 (1st Dist.
1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980). This position is in accord with decisions
in those jurisdictions which have expanded the categories of beneficiaries through case law.
See, note 42, supra.
72. See, note 64, supra.
73. The dissent also concluded that the UCC four-year limitations period was applicable;
consequently, NAC's motion to dismiss should have been denied. Knox v. North Am. Car
Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 700, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1367 (1st Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No.
78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
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OBSERVATIONS
The dissent's position is consistent with decisions in other juris-
dictions which have abolished privity as a defense in breach of
warranty actions."' For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has comprehensively articulated the rationale underlying the de-
mise of privity." An analysis of Pennsylvania decisions reveals four
74. See, note 42, supra.
75. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished horizontal and vertical privity in a series
of decisions spanning a period of eleven years. Ten years after adoption of the UCC, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee of a purchaser,
who was injured when an unopened bottle of carbonated water exploded, was a proper bene-
ficiary within the scope of §2-318. (Pennsylvania has adopted Alternative A of UCC §2-318.)
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). The court strictly con-
strued the language of §2-318 and denied recovery to plaintiff because he was not a member
of one of the designated categories. Id. at 615, 187 A.2d at 577. The court's desire to main-
tain a distinction between actions predicated on tort and those predicated on contract was a
major factor in its decision. Id.
In Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964), the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court retreated from its strict constructionist approach and permitted recovery by a
hotel manager who personally purchased, on behalf of his employer, four bottles of cham-
pagne. Id. at 274, 199 A.2d at 464. The cork from one of the bottles ejected and hit the
manager in the eye. Id. The court distinguished Hochgertel by ruling that since the manager
actually purchased the product, he satisfied the Code's definition of "buyer." Id. Subse-
quently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted strict liability in tort. Webb v. Zern, 422
Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
The court in Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968), abolished vertical
privity and noted that the concept ignored commercial realities and fostered multiplicity of
litigation. Id. at 227, 246 A.2d at 853. Furthermore, prior to the adoption of strict liability in
tort, abolishing privity in UCC implied warranty actions would have permitted recovery in
contract actions while denying recovery if the same suit had been filed as a tort action. The
court logically concluded that the adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (1965)
with its attendant public policy justifications compelled a finding that both actions are coex-
tensive. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 854.
Having abolished vertical privity in contract and tort actions for breach of warranty, the
next logical step was to abolish the requirement of horizontal privity. This step was taken in
Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974). An employee suffered loss of
hearing as a result of an explosion of a steam boiler and sought recovery in contract from
the retailer and the manufacturer. Id. at 904. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the complaint stated a valid cause of action. Id. at 905.
The court reasoned that Kassab sought to effect identical results regardless of whether
the complaint sounded in tort or contract, thus eliminating the basic premise for both verti-
cal and horizontal privity. Id. The key factors in the court's decision were adoption of 402A
liability and recognition that society's interests were not served by permitting a manufac-
turer to place a defective product in the stream of commerce and then to avoid liability
based on the technical requirement of privity of contract. Id. at 907. These two factors
eliminated the Hochgertel court's justification for retention of privity and compelled aboli-
tion of the doctrine. Id.
For a complete analysis of the demise of privity in Pennsylvania, see, Jaeger, Privity of
Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duq. U. L. Rev. 1 (1963); Murray, Products Liabil-
ity-Another Word, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 255 (1973); Comment, The Tocsin Has Sounded: A
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key factors which led the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to abolish
horizontal privity in personal injury actions predicated upon
breach of the UCC warranty provisions:
1. Existence of prior exceptions to the privity doctrine.
2. Adoption of strict liability in tort and its attendant social pol-
icy justifications.
3. Recognition of the intent expressed in the Official Comments
to UCC §2-318 to permit judicial expansion of qualified
beneficiaries.
4. Achievement of uniformity among actions.
All four factors have been present in Illinois decisions evaluating
the privity doctrine.7 6 Yet, the court in Knox relied on a doctrine
which had virtually been eliminated in tort actions for personal in-
juries." The decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on this
issue represent the preferable approach.
Prior Exceptions to the Privity Doctrine
The erosion of the doctrine of privity in Illinois is evidenced by
early decisions which restricted privity.7 8 Illinois courts developed"
numerous exceptions to circumvent the privity requirement in
breach of warranty actions. The doctrine was not applicable where
the product was negligently manufactured; 79 where the product
was sold or delivered without disclosure of its dangerous quali-
ties;80 where the product was imminently or inherently danger-
ous;81 or where the implied warranty ran with the sale of the prod-
Post-Mortem Examination of Privity of Warranty in Pennsylvania, 13 Duq. U. L. Rev. 53
(1974); 48 Temple L. Q. 807 (1975).
76. See, notes 19.1 through 33, supra, and accompanying text.
77. When the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the requirement of privity in all tort
cases, it stated:
To eliminate any uncertainty still remaining after Suvada v. White Motor Co.
(citations omitted) we emphasize that lack of direct contractual relationship be-
tween the parties is not a defense in a tort action in this jurisdiction. Thus, tort
liability will henceforth be measured by the scope of the duty owed rather than
the artifical concepts of privity.
Having discarded any remnants of the privity concept, we now concern our-
selves with the scope of defendant's liability using traditional tortious misrepre-
sentation standards.
Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 62, 250 N.E.2d 656, 660 (1969).
78. See, notes 19.1 through 26, supra, and accompanying text.
79. Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Ill. App. 355 (1st Dist. 1912).
80. Id.
81. Id. (imminently dangerous product); Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d
28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1957)(inherently dangerous product).
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uct.82  This approach culminated in extension of warranty
protection to a third party user who sustained no personal injuries
but suffered property damage."3
The court in Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co.8 abolished vertical
privity as a requisite to recovery in UCC breach of warranty ac-
tions. With respect to personal injury actions for breach of war-
ranty, the privity doctrine retains viability only where the injured
party is not the ultimate purchaser. The enactment of UCC §2-
318, however, has significantly restricted the applicability of the
doctrine even in this situation. This section expressly designates
third party users who may enforce warranties despite lack of priv-
ity. The decision reached in Knox is decidedly contrary to the con-
tinued erosion of the doctrine reflected in these authorities.
Effect of Strict Liability in Tort
Illinois courts have consistently relied on public policy to under-
mine the privity doctrine as a defense in warranty actions for per-
sonal injuries.8 5 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that public pol-
icy considerations were the primary factors underlying the
adoption of the theory of strict liability in tort. 6 The court articu-
lated these considerations as follows: 1) society's interest in health
and life demanded the fullest possible legal protection; 2) affirma-
tive solicitation through marketing and advertising rendered the
manufacturer liable for damages resulting from a defective prod-
uct; and 3) losses are more appropriately borne by the manufac-
turer which created the risk of injury and profited by the market-
ing of its product.87
Another policy consideration is that as manufacturing technol-
ogy becomes more sophisticated, imposing strict liability is one
means to deter manufacturers from marketing defective prod-
ucts. 8 Also, as the number of intermediate parties between the
manufacturer and ultimate consumer increases, permitting suits
82. Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1st Dist. 1947).
83. Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 363, 219 N.E.2d 726
(Ist Dist. 1966).
84. 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). See, notes 44 through 46, supra, and accompa-
nying text.
85. See, notes 27 through 30, supra, and accompanying text.
86. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I1. 2d 612, 618-19, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
87. Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The court derived these considerations by analogy
from sale of food cases. See, note 20, supra.
88. But see, Prosser, The Assault, supra, note 14 at 1119, where the author challenges
the validity of this argument.
19801
Loyola University Law Journal
directly against a remote manufacturer avoids circuity of actions.8"
In Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co.90 the court underscored the vital-
ity and continued recognition of these policy considerations. Based
on its conclusion that tort liability and implied warranty liability
are similar, the court abolished privity as a defense to personal in-
jury actions by purchasers for breach of an implied warranty under
the UCC.91 Having thus transferred the policy justifications from a
tort context to a commercial warranty context for the purpose of
eliminating the requirement of vertical privity, the distinction be-
tween vertical and horizontal privity advocated by the court in
Knox appears to be arbitrary.
Effect of the Official Comments to UCC §2-318
In Knox, the court based its holding on a determination that
"the legislature consciously chose to limit a seller's liability for
breach of warranty to the specific classes enumerated therein.""9
Prior decisions by Illinois courts fail to support this interpretation
of UCC §2-318.
In Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., the court, in
dictum, construed the language in Comment 3 to mean that "the
extension to these specified third-party beneficiaries is not in-
tended to exclude others."' "9 What was implicit in Rhodes became
explicit in Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co.94 The Berry court concluded
that the language in §2-318 and the accompanying commentary
did not require privity between the purchaser and the remote man-
ufacturer.95 Applying basic rules of statutory construction, the
court stated "[the code provisions pertaining to warranties] clearly
demonstrate the legislative intent to create a statutory cause of ac-
tion for breach of implied warranty to afford consumer protection
to those who sustain personal injuries resulting from product de-
ficiencies." A restrictive interpretation of UCC §2-318 defeats this
intent.
89. Article Two Warranties, supra, note 14 at 255-56.
90. 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
91. Id. at 558, 309 N.E.2d at 556. See, notes 44 through 46, supra, and accompanying
text.
92. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 111. App. 3d 683, 689, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (1st
Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
93. 72 I1. App. 2d 363, 370, 219 N.E.2d 726, 731 (1st Dist. 1966).
94. 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
95. Id. at 558, 309 N.E.2d at 557.
96. Id. at 553, 309 N.E.2d at 553. (Emphasis added.)
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The court in Knox undermines its own interpretation by sug-
gesting that an employee of a purchaser may be permitted to re-
cover from a remote manufacturer despite exclusion of employees
from the classes of beneficiaries specifically enumerated in the
statute.97 This position, however, is consistent with other jurisdic-
tions which have extended protection to employees under UCC §2-
318. Recovery has been permitted on the grounds that a manufac-
turer knows that in a corporate setting employees are the actual
users of products" or that employees are within the employer's in-
dustrial family.9
Recovery has been allowed in situations involving passengers
and bystanders due to the public policies upon which products lia-
bility law rests.100 The Knox court impliedly recognized these poli-
cies where employees of purchasers seek to enforce warranties
under the UCC. Yet, the court failed to give effect to these consid-
erations in its decision.
Finally, reliance on legislative action overlooks the origin of priv-
ity as a judicial doctrine. The Illinois Supreme Court has previ-
ously responded to this assertion stating, "the doctrine . . .was
created by this court alone. Having found that doctrine to be un-
sound and unjust under present conditions, we consider that we
have not only the power, but the duty, to abolish that [doctrine].
We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we
can likewise open them."10' 1
Uniformity Among Actions
An undesirable ramification of the Knox decision is that recov-
97. See, note 64, supra.
98. Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 681 (10th Cir.
1967)(applying Oklahoma law)(court adopted "common knowledge" approach to eliminate
privity in personal injury warranty actions brought by employees; this approach presumes a
manufacturer's knowledge that businesses operate through employees who are the actual
users of products purchased by their employers).
99. McNally v. Nicholson Mfg., Co., 313 A.2d 913, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 381 (Me. 1973)(em-
ployee member of employer's corporate "family"). See also, Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.,
54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960).
100. In Roberts v. General Dynamics, Convair Corp., 425 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Tex. 1977),
recovery was allowed for an implied warranty absent privity by a passenger whose hearing
was impaired when a pressurization failure occurred in the airplane in which she was travel-
ing. The court in Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., Inc., 40 A.D.2d 289, 293, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 720
(App. Div. 1973), allowed recovery to a bystander on the grounds that "bystanders have less
opportunity to detect any defect than either purchasers or users."
101. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). (Cita-
tions ommitted.)
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ery by a third party user may depend on the nature of the com-
plaint-whether the complaint is premised on liability under UCC
§2-318 or tort liability. Reviving the tort-contract dichotomy ig-
nores the substantive similarities between the two causes of action.
Warranties in actions for personal injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are a means to afford consumer protection. Advance-
ments in marketing and advertising techniques and manufacturing
technology enable a manufacturer to solicit the use of its product
from a greater segment of the consuming public. This element plus
the increased profits resulting from wide scale distribution of a
product place the manufacturer in a better position to assume re-
sponsibility for personal injuries due to the defective condition of
the product. These factors underlie the cause of action regardless
of whether it is premised on tort or contract theory.102
Consumer protection is the primary factor underlying the scope
of a manufacturer's liability for products related injuries in actions
predicated on strict liability in tort 03 or UCC §2-318.1" In tort
actions, foreseeability defines the scope of liability and may in-
clude persons outside the purchasing chain. Consumer protection
is restricted by the Code's retention of artificial distinctions based
on privity. Warranty actions must be coextensive in order to afford
the fullest possible protection to consumers for products related
injuries. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly concluded
that "the same demands of legal symmetry which once supported
privity now destroy it."'1 °S
102. See, e.g., Roberts v. General Dynamics, Convair Corp., 425 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Tex.
1977). The court stated:
To waive the privity requirement in a personal injury case where the warranty
arises in "tort" while retaining it where the warranty arises in "contract" is to
perpetuate a formalistic distinction at the expense of the public policy considera-
tions repeatedly emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court. The Texas cases that
have held privity still necessary have involved not personal but purely economic
injury.
Id. at 691.
103. See, notes 28 through 30, supra, and accompanying text.
104. Where the sole recovery is for economic loss, the policy considerations underlying
the demise of privity are less compelling. Consequently, privity has retained greater viability
in this situation. The court in Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194,
364 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist. 1977), affirmed this distinction holding that "tort theory... does
not extend to permit recovery against a manufacturer for solely 'economic losses' absent
property damage or personal injury from the use of the product." Id. at 203, 364 N.E.2d at
107. The court limited its holding to actions for economic loss predicated on the theories of
negligence and strict liability in tort noting that the commercial expectations of purchasers
and sellers is within the province of contract law as expressed through the UCC. Id.
105. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 229, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968).
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RECOMMENDATION
Illinois courts should adopt the standard asserted in the Knox
dissent and extend the protection of UCC §2-318 to all persons
who may reasonably be expected to be affected by a breach of im-
plied warranty irrespective of privity.'0 6 This criterion would give
full effect to products liability case law as it has developed in Illi-
nois and to the legislative intent to create a statutory cause of ac-
tion through enactment of the UCC warranty provisions. Thus, Il-
linois would join a growing number of jurisdictions that have
adopted foreseeability as the standard for determining the scope of
a manufacturer's liability to the ultimate user or consumer of its
product.'0 7
The doctrine of privity has been judicially restricted in personal
injury actions for breach of warranty to such an extent that it is
applicable only in actions brought under the UCC where horizontal
privity is at issue. Adopting a standard of foreseeability would
achieve maximum uniformity in products liability suits by elimi-
nating technical distinctions based on privity. When the Illinois
Supreme Court abandoned privity as a defense in tort actions, it
purportedly "discarded any remnants of the privity concept"'10 in
tort actions for products related injuries. As the dissent in Knox
aptly noted, "this court should not pick up the discarded remnants
of privity in personal injury actions and mold them back into our
law, where they are destined for eradication again."'0 "
CONCLUSION
Illinois court decisions evidence a trend toward the abolition of
privity as a requisite to recovery in implied warranty actions. Early
recognition of exceptions to the doctrine coupled with an identifi-
able need to fully and adequately protect consumers who suffer
products related injuries advanced this trend. A logical extension
of these factors compels eradication of the remaining traces of this
anachronistic doctrine. Legislative amendment of UCC §2-318 or
adoption of Alternative B 0 would effect a result consistent with
106. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 698, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (1st
Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980). See, notes 67 through 73, supra,
and accompanying text.
107. See, note 42, supra.
108. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Il. 2d 54, 62, 250 N.E.2d 656, 660 (1969).
109. Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 699, 399 N.E. 2d 1355, 1366 (1st
Dist. 1980), appeal denied, No. 78-1114 (May 29, 1980).
110. The text of Alternative B is reproduced at note 4, supra.
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social policy. Absent such action, Illinois courts should adopt the
approach manifested by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and
abolish privity to promote uniform recovery for products related
injuries under strict liability in tort or the Uniform Commercial
Code.
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